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Configure the Temporal Proxy

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The proxy reads a single YAML file. Three sections are the core of it: the gateway listener (hostPort), routing, and the upstreams it forwards to.

Everything else is optional.

allowedServices narrows which gRPC services the proxy forwards
tls and auth secure and admit inbound connections
encryption seals payloads
extensionServers declares the servers auth and encryption delegate to
health tunes the liveness check
metrics configures the Prometheus endpoint
apiTranslations overrides how the proxy reaches Temporal Cloud's control plane

Values support ${VAR} and $VAR environment variable expansion, and an upstream's hostPort can be a template that resolves per request (for example, {{ .RemoteNamespace }}).

The example below is the proxy's Temporal Cloud example, which connects a Worker to Temporal Cloud with an API key. The Worker carries no Cloud configuration: it talks plaintext to 127.0.0.1:7233, and the proxy adds TLS, the API key, and the Namespace rewrite on the way out.

# Gateway: the local endpoint your Workers and Clients connect to (plaintext).
hostPort: 127.0.0.1:7233

routing:
  default: cloud # Namespaced requests.
  system: system # Namespace-less requests (for example GetSystemInfo on connect).

upstreams:
  # Namespaced traffic. The host is derived per request from the translated
  # Namespace, so one entry serves any number of Namespaces.
  - name: cloud
    hostPort: '{{ .RemoteNamespace }}.tmprl.cloud:7233'
    namespaces:
      rules:
        suffix: .$TEMPORAL_ACCOUNT # quickstart becomes quickstart.<account>
    credentials:
      static:
        apiKey: $TEMPORAL_API_KEY

  # Namespace-less calls have no Namespace to derive a host from, so they use a
  # fixed endpoint. Any Namespace endpoint in the account answers them.
  - name: system
    hostPort: ${TEMPORAL_NAMESPACE}.${TEMPORAL_ACCOUNT}.tmprl.cloud:7233
    credentials:
      static:
        apiKey: ${TEMPORAL_API_KEY}

Neither upstream declares a tls block, because the proxy dials over TLS by default. See Configure TLS.

The chart values.yaml and the temporal-proxy repository hold the complete, current set of options.

Restrict forwarded services

The top-level allowedServices list names the gRPC services the proxy forwards, by proto full name. Omit it and the proxy forwards WorkflowService and OperatorService, which is what an SDK Client, a Worker, the CLI, and the Web UI need.

allowedServices:
  - temporal.api.workflowservice.v1.WorkflowService
  - temporal.api.operatorservice.v1.OperatorService
  - grpc.reflection.v1.ServerReflection

Service	Backs	In the default set
`temporal.api.workflowservice.v1.WorkflowService`	Every SDK Client, Worker, and the Web UI	Yes
`temporal.api.operatorservice.v1.OperatorService`	`temporal operator` commands, and the Web UI's Search Attribute and Nexus views	Yes
`grpc.reflection.v1.ServerReflection`	Service discovery for tools such as `grpcurl`	No

Those three are the whole set to select from. A name the proxy cannot forward fails the configuration at startup rather than at the first request.

A service you leave out is never forwarded. The gateway answers a call to one with Unimplemented and unknown service "<name>", decided before any upstream work, so the proxy behaves as a server that does not implement it rather than passing the call through.

Service discovery is opt-in, so name the reflection service only when you want tools such as grpcurl to probe the gateway. Allowing grpc.reflection.v1.ServerReflection also allows the superseded grpc.reflection.v1alpha.ServerReflection, because clients probe v1 and fall back to it. The relation runs one way: allowing only the superseded spelling does not allow the current one.

Health checks

The gateway serves the standard gRPC health service and publishes an entry for every allowed service under its proto full name, alongside the usual empty service name. Each entry reports the same status, since the proxy's health is process-wide. A Client health check that names a service, such as the Go SDK's CheckHealth, therefore gets a status, and so does a per-service liveness probe. A service your configuration does not allow returns NOT_FOUND instead of claiming a status.

Behind that status is a liveness check the proxy runs against itself. On each interval it calls grpc.health.v1.Health/Watch over an in-process connection, reads one message, and reports whether the exchange was answered at all. Watch is a streaming method, so the call travels the same interceptor chain every forwarded request goes through, and a stall in that chain shows up in the reported status instead of going unnoticed. The call never leaves the process, so the check behaves the same whether the gateway serves plaintext, TLS, or mutual TLS.

What the check does not cover is anything below that chain: accepting on the real listener, and the TLS handshake above it. Those belong to whatever probes the proxy from outside. See Probe the gateway for the Kubernetes side.

Tune the cadence under the top-level health block. Both fields are optional:

health:
  interval: 30s # How often the liveness check runs. Defaults to 30s.
  timeout: 5s # Bounds one run. Defaults to 5s.

timeout must be positive and strictly shorter than interval, so a check always finishes before the next one begins. A configuration that breaks that rule fails at startup.

Route requests

The routing section selects an upstream for each request:

default is the fallback when no rule matches. It is optional; omit it to reject unmatched requests with an error.
system is the upstream for Namespace-less requests, such as the SDK's GetSystemInfo and GetClusterInfo calls. It is optional; when unset, those requests fall back to default.
rules is an ordered list, evaluated top to bottom. The first match wins.

Every upstream named by default, system, or a rule must exist in upstreams. Upstream name and hostPort values must each be unique across the list: two upstreams sharing a name make a routing reference ambiguous, and two sharing an address is a copy-paste error rather than a useful configuration.

routing:
  default: local # Fallback when no rule matches.
  system: cloud # Namespace-less requests.
  rules:
    - match:
        namespace: 'prod-*'
        metadata:
          x-tier: gold
      upstream: cloud
    - match:
        namespace: '*-test'
      upstream: local

A rule matches when its Namespace matches and every metadata condition matches (AND logic). A match must set at least one of namespace or metadata; an empty match is a configuration error, since that is what default is for. Routing runs on the local Namespace, before translation.

namespace is a string literal or a simple glob with a single leading or trailing *:

Pattern	Matches
`payments`	exactly `payments`
`prod-*`	names starting with `prod-`
`*-test`	names ending with `-test`
`-test-`	names containing `-test-`
`*`	any Namespace

A * in any other position, such as a*b, is invalid.

metadata matches gRPC request metadata (headers). Keys are case-insensitive and do not support wildcards; values use the same glob syntax as namespace. A key matches when any of the request's values for it match.

Translate Namespaces

Applications connected to the proxy use short, local Namespace names. Each upstream rewrites those names to the ones its Temporal Service expects, under namespaces.rules. The rewrite applies to requests and is reversed on responses, so callers only ever see the local name.

upstreams:
  - name: cloud
    hostPort: '{{ .RemoteNamespace }}.tmprl.cloud:7233'
    namespaces:
      rules:
        prefix: '' # Optional string prepended to the local name.
        suffix: .acct # payments becomes payments.acct
        overrides: # Explicit pairs that bypass prefix and suffix.
          - local: billing
            remote: payments.acct

prefix and suffix wrap every local Namespace: the remote name is prefix + local + suffix, and responses are unwrapped back to the local name.
overrides lists explicit local and remote pairs for names that do not follow the prefix and suffix convention. An override takes precedence over the prefix and suffix rules. Each local name and each remote name may appear only once.

An upstream's hostPort and tls.serverName can be Go templates resolved per request, so one upstream can serve many Namespaces. Available variables:

{{ .LocalNamespace }}: the Namespace before translation.
{{ .RemoteNamespace }}: the Namespace after translation.
{{ .Metadata.<key> }} or {{ index .Metadata "<key>" }}: a request metadata value.

Upstreams with a static hostPort connect eagerly at startup; templated ones connect lazily on first use.

Translate to a Temporal Cloud upstream

Temporal Cloud takes a fully qualified <name>.<account-id>, so the proxy checks the names a Cloud upstream's rules produce:

suffix must be .<account-id>.
Each override's remote must be a complete Cloud Namespace identifier.

A Namespace name runs 2 to 39 characters, starts with a letter, ends with a letter or number, and holds only lowercase letters, numbers, and -. An account identifier runs 5 to 20 characters. Both are checked at startup, so rules that cannot produce a valid Cloud name fail before the proxy serves anything.

The proxy recognizes Cloud from the address: any .tmprl.cloud host, templated ones included. A tls.serverName on the Cloud domain counts too, since a private-link upstream reaches Cloud through a per-VPC hostname but still pins Cloud's certificate. When neither names the Cloud domain, declare it:

upstreams:
  - name: cloud
    hostPort: my-vpc-endpoint.example.internal:7233
    cloud: true # Declare Cloud for an address carrying no Cloud domain.
    namespaces:
      rules:
        suffix: .acct

A templated hostPort resolves per request, so the name it produces cannot be checked at startup. The proxy logs a warning when a translated name is not shaped like a Cloud Namespace and forwards the request unchanged.

Answer the methods Cloud does not serve

Temporal Cloud does not serve every WorkflowService method on a Namespace endpoint. ListNamespaces is one this affects, for example: Cloud pins a request to the endpoint's Namespace, and a ListNamespaces request names none, so the call can never succeed on a Namespace frontend. Cloud exposes the same capability as CloudService.GetNamespaces on its control plane.

The proxy answers such a call from the control plane and converts the reply back into the response the caller expected. This needs no configuration. It follows from an upstream already being Temporal Cloud, and the control plane is reached at saas-api.tmprl.cloud:443 with that upstream's own credentials, since one Temporal Cloud API key authorizes both. The connection opens on first use rather than at startup, so a control plane you cannot reach does not stop the proxy serving everything else.

Only Namespace-less calls are affected, which means only the upstream that serves them, named by routing.system or falling back to routing.default. To get the untranslated failure back, route those requests at a Temporal Service that serves them.

Override the control plane under apiTranslations.cloudApi, which takes the same keys as an upstream:

apiTranslations:
  cloudApi:
    hostPort: saas-api.tmprl.cloud:443 # Defaults to Cloud's control plane.
    credentials:
      static:
        apiKey: ${TEMPORAL_CLOUD_API_KEY}

Set cloudApi in two cases:

The upstream authenticates with a client certificate. Set an API key under credentials. The Cloud Ops API accepts only API keys, so the proxy has no credential to inherit from the upstream, and it refuses translated calls until you provide one.
You need to reach a different Cloud environment. Set hostPort to that environment's control plane. If the address isn't a Cloud endpoint, the proxy reports it at startup but still accepts it, because test doubles and private environments often use addresses outside the Cloud domain.

TLS is not inherited from the upstream, since the control plane is a different host and the upstream's server name or client certificate would not apply. The dial default stands instead, verifying against the system root pool.

Authenticate and authorize inbound requests

Inbound authentication runs on the gateway and is off by default: omit the top-level auth block to accept all requests. When present, auth must select exactly one authenticator: staticToken, jwks, or external. The gateway decides before the request is routed, so nothing reaches an upstream until the caller is admitted, and it strips the credential before forwarding upstream.

Compare an inbound bearer token against a fixed value with staticToken:

auth:
  staticToken:
    token: ${GATEWAY_TOKEN} # Required. The expected token value.
    header: authorization # Header to read the token from.
    scheme: Bearer # Scheme prefix to strip before comparing.

Or verify a JWT's signature and claims against a JWKS endpoint with jwks:

auth:
  jwks:
    url: https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json # Required. Absolute https URL.
    audiences:
      - temporal-proxy
    issuer: https://issuer.example.com/
    header: authorization
    scheme: Bearer

token (for staticToken) and url (for jwks) are required; the remaining fields are optional.

Delegate the decision to an extension server

For an identity system neither built-in authenticator covers, or for a decision that turns on more than who the caller is, point auth.external at an extension server you run. Declare the server under the top-level extensionServers block, the same way you would a key management backend, and the proxy asks it about every stream it accepts, forwarding only the ones it is told to admit.

extensionServers:
  - name: authz
    hostPort: 127.0.0.1:9444

auth:
  external:
    name: authz # Required. Names an entry in extensionServers.
    credentialHeaders:
      - authorization

name must match a configured extension server. credentialHeaders names the metadata headers that carry the caller's credentials: the proxy lifts those into the request it sends the extension server and removes them from the stream it forwards upstream, so a credential the server consumes never reaches the Temporal Service.

Declaring no headers does not hide the caller's credentials from the extension server, since the proxy forwards the caller's other metadata on the call either way. What you lose is the field naming them, so the server has to know which metadata to read and cannot tell a header the proxy vouches for from any other. Nothing is stripped before forwarding upstream either, so the caller's credential continues to the upstream alongside any credential configured for it.

The server implements api.auth.v1.AuthService, one RPC defined in api/auth/v1. Each request carries what the call is addressing and who is making it:

Field	Carries
`target.full_name`	The gRPC full method being invoked, leading slash included. Always set.
`target.namespace`	The Temporal Namespace the request names.
`credentials`	One entry per declared header the caller sent, each with the canonical header name and every value sent under it.

Both target fields come from the stream rather than from anything the caller claims, so a caller cannot forge either by sending a header. target.namespace is empty when the method names no Namespace, when the caller sent no message to read one from, or when the service is not one the proxy forwards. Empty means unknown rather than a Namespace called nothing, so match a Namespace-scoped rule against full_name as well. credentials is empty when you declared no headers or the caller sent none of them, which is an unauthenticated caller rather than a trusted one.

Answer with a decision:

DECISION_ALLOW admits the caller and is the only value that does. A response left unfilled is DECISION_UNSPECIFIED, which denies, so there is no way to admit a caller by omission.
DECISION_DENY refuses the caller, who is told PERMISSION_DENIED.
reason is optional and written for whoever operates the server. The proxy records it and keeps it out of what a refused caller is told, so it can name internal systems or subjects.

Return a gRPC error only for reaching no verdict at all, such as a backend the server cannot itself reach. The proxy denies either way, but an error keeps its status code, so UNAVAILABLE or DEADLINE_EXCEEDED tells a Worker to retry where a denial tells it not to bother. A server that cannot reach its own backend should report that rather than admit the caller.

The authorization example maps a JWT to claims and then decides each call against them, the two steps Temporal Server splits across its ClaimMapper and Authorizer. It includes a Worker that cannot reach a second Namespace and an auditor that can read Workflow History but not start a Workflow.

Present credentials to upstreams

Each upstream can present its own credential to the Temporal Service, set under credentials. static is the only variant today; it injects a fixed API key as a bearer header on every outbound request, which is how you connect to Temporal Cloud:

upstreams:
  - name: cloud
    hostPort: my-ns.acct.tmprl.cloud:7233
    credentials:
      static:
        apiKey: ${TEMPORAL_API_KEY} # Required.
        header: authorization # Optional header override.
        scheme: Bearer # Optional scheme override.

Credentials require TLS to the upstream. The proxy dials over TLS by default, so this is only an issue when you also set insecure: true. Credentials on a plaintext hop fail the configuration at startup rather than putting the key on the wire in the clear.

Configure TLS

TLS is configured in two independent places, both using the same keys: ca, cert, key, and serverName. ca, cert, and key are paths to PEM files on disk, not inline PEM content. On Kubernetes, let the chart mount them from a Secret and fill in the paths for you, as described in Supply TLS material.

The two directions default differently, because a dialer can fall back on the system root pool and a listener has no certificate to fall back on.

Inbound, on the gateway. The top-level tls block secures connections from your applications. Set cert and key for server TLS, and add ca to enforce mutual TLS, which requires each client to present a certificate signed by that CA. A gateway with no tls block serves plaintext, which is what local development usually handles.

Outbound, per upstream. Each upstream dials over TLS whether or not it declares a tls block:

No tls block verifies the upstream against the system root certificate pool and presents no client certificate. This is what Temporal Cloud with an API key needs.
ca alone verifies the upstream against a private trust anchor, still presenting no client certificate.
cert and key together select mutual TLS and require ca. They must be set as a pair.
insecure: true dials plaintext, for a local development Service that terminates no TLS.

Set serverName when the host you dial does not match the common name or SAN on the server's certificate.

insecure and a tls block cannot be set together because they are opposite, so the configuration fails at startup rather than silently picking one. The same rules govern every outbound hop, so an extensionServers entry and the apiTranslations.cloudApi block read exactly the same way.

Version note

v0.6.0 made TLS the default for everything the proxy dials. Before it, an upstream with no tls block connected in plaintext. A tls: {} block still means what it always did, so configurations that declared one keep working, but an upstream that relied on the old plaintext default now needs insecure: true.

For payload encryption (envelope encryption, cloud KMS, and custom key backends), see Encrypt payloads.

Restrict forwarded services​

Health checks​

Route requests​

Translate Namespaces​

Translate to a Temporal Cloud upstream​

Answer the methods Cloud does not serve​

Authenticate and authorize inbound requests​

Delegate the decision to an extension server​

Present credentials to upstreams​

Configure TLS​